(麻省理工)防止核武扩散,核能安全措施和出口管制 25页

Nonproliferation,Safeguards,andExportControlsMatthewBunnManagingtheAtomProject,HarvardUniversityLecturefor“NuclearEnergyEconomicsandPolicyAnalysis”April7,2004http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atomTheProliferationProblemuHowtokeephostilestatesandterroristgroupsfromgettingnuclearweapons?1945technology…howtocontrol?uEssentialingredientsofnuclearweapons–HEUandseparatedplutonium–donotoccurinnatureandarehardtoproduce(someotherisotopesalsoweapons-usable,butevenhardertoproduce)uIftheycangetenoughHEUorplutonium,moststates–andpotentiallyevensomewell-organizedterroristgroups,suchasalQaida–couldmakeatleastacrudenuclearbombuSo,approachhasbeen:(a)controlHEU+Pu,(b)limitthespreadoffacilitiestomakethem,(c)makesurenomaterialisdivertedfromthefacilitiestomakethemthatdoexistuTechnologyfornuclearweaponsandnuclearenergyinherentlylinked1 TheNonproliferationRegimeuGlobalefforttostemthespreadofnuclearweapons--includinglimitingciviliannuclearenergy’scontributiontoweaponsuCombinespoliticalmeasures(designedtoreducedemandfornuclearweapons)andtechnicalmeasures(designedtorestrictsupplyofnuclearweaponsmaterialsandtechnologies)uSurprisinglysuccessful:ratherthanmanydozensofnuclearweaponspowerspredictedbynow,only8-9--manymorestateshavestartedweaponsprogramsandthenbackedawaythannowhavenuclearweapons.DozensofstateshavethecapabilitytoproducenuclearweaponsbuthaveverifiablycommittednottodosoTheNuclearNonproliferationTreatyuNearly190partiesuEssentiallyallcountriesexceptIndia,Pakistan,andIsraelarepartiestotheNPTorcomparablecommitmentsu5acceptedweaponstates:U.S.,Russia,France,UK,ChinauBasicprovisions:–Non-nuclear-weaponstatesagreenottoacquirenuclearweaponsandtoacceptIAEAsafeguardsonalltheirciviliannuclearactivities–Nuclear-weaponstatesagreenottoprovidenuclearweaponstechnologytonon-nuclear-weaponstates,andtonegotiateingoodfaithtowarddisarmament–AllpartiestocooperateinthepeacefuluseofnuclearenergyuNowundersubstantialstress–NorthKoreanwithdrawal,AQKhanglobalblack-marketnetwork,Iranianexploitationofloopholes–butunlikelytocollapse2 CategoriesofProliferationThreatsuTechnicallysophisticatedstates(e.g.,India,Israel)Havethetechnologytoproducefissilematerial,fissionweapons;safeguardscandetectdiversionofmaterial,constructionofsecretfacilities(maybe),politicalmeasurescanhelpreducedemandforweaponsuLesssophisticatedstates(e.g.,Iraq,NorthKorea)Technologycontrolscanaddsubstantialtimeandcosttoeffortstoproduceweaponsmaterials;stolennuclearmaterialcouldgreatlyaccelerateacquisitionof1stbomb;othermeasuresasaboveuSubnationalgroups(e.g.,AumShinrikyo,AlQaeda)Conceivablecouldproducecrudebuteffectiveexplosivesiftheyacquiredfissilematerial(esp.HEU),orcouldsellstolenmaterialtoastate--riskoftheftofnuclearmaterial5PathstotheBombuNonon-weaponsobligation,materialproducedindedicatedmilitaryfacilitieswithnosafeguards–All5NPTweaponstates,India,Pakistan,Israel(thoughsomenon-verifiedpeacefuluseassurancesinlattercases)uJoinNPT,acceptsafeguards,buildneededfacilities,thenwithdrawandexpelinspectors–N.Korea(sortof--neverhadfullsafeguards)--Iraninthefuture?uJoinNPT,acceptsafeguards,divertmaterialfromdeclared,safeguardedfacility–ThisisonlypathtraditionalIAEAsafeguardsdesignedtodetectuJoinNPT,acceptsafeguards,buildcovertfacilities–Iraq,N.Korea(Uprogram)--Iran???–AdditionalProtocoldesignedtohelpdetectuPurchaseorstealweaponorweaponmaterial3 IAEASafeguardsu1100nuclearinstallationsin>70states,thousandsoftonsofmaterial(>123,000significantquantities)undersafeguardsu10,000person-daysofinspection/yr,~$90MIAEAsafeguardsbudget(sameasIndianopolispolicedepartment)uDesignedtodetectdiversionofmaterialforweapons--cannotpreventthestate,orsubnationalparties,fromremovingmaterialforweaponsuPrimarilyimplementedinnon-nuclear-weaponstates;afewfacilitiesinweaponstatesunder“voluntaryoffer”;somefacilitiesinnon-NPTstatessafeguardedwhensupplierrequiredituNPTmemberstateshaverepeatedlyexpressedconfidencethatIAEAsafeguardsverifystatesarecomplyingTraditionalSafeguardsuTraditionalsafeguardsuse“materialaccountancy”and“containmentandsurveillance”toprovidetimelydetectionofdiversionofsignificantquantitiesofnuclearmaterial,andtodetersuchdiversionbytheriskofdetectionuSignificantquantities:–PuorU233:8kg–HEU:25kgcontainedU-235–Bombscanbemadewithless--akeyissueuTimelinessgoal:–1monthforunirradiatedPuorHEU(incl.MOX)uTraditionalsafeguardsfocusalmostexclusivelyondetectingdiversionfromdeclaredfacilities–notonfindingsecretfacilities4 TraditionalSafeguards(II)uINFCIRC/153--traditionalsafeguardsagreement--negotiatedatatimewhennuclearenergyexpectedtobecrucialtonationaleconomies,non-nuclear-weaponstatesconcernedtopreventsafeguardsfrominterfering,orofferingcommercialadvantagetoweaponstatesuINFCIRC/153--limitsIAEAto“minimum”info“consistentwithcarryingoutitsresponsibilities”--verificationmainlylimitedtofew“strategicpoints”indeclaredfacilitiesuResult:IAEAinspectors’cultureofnotaskingtoomanyquestions,notbeingaggressiveinvestigators(over-generalization--contrarycasesexist,suchasTaiwan)MaterialAccountancyMUF(MaterialUnaccountedFor)=Beginninginventory+Additionstoinventory-Endinginventory-Removalsfrominventoryus2MUF--standarddeviationofMUF--ismeasurementprecisionuIfMUF>thansomethresholdlevel--usually3s2MUF--IAEArejectsthehypothesisthatrealMUFiszero,investigatespossibilitythatdiversionhasoccurreduForitemfacility(e.g.,LWR),MUF=0unlesssomethingismissing5 MaterialAccountancy(II)ToolsofMaterialAccountancyuDestructiveAnalysis–Takeachemicalsampleofthematerialtolaboratoryforanalysis.Highlyaccurate,butexpensiveandlongdelays.uNon-DestructiveAnalysis(NDA)–Measurecontentofnuclearmaterialbymeasuringgammaandneutronspectra(orotherproperties)usingportableoron-siteequipment.Lessaccurate(typically),butfarmoreconvenient.DAcanbeusedtocalibrateandconfirmtheaccuracyofNDAequipment.InternationalAccountancyStandardsFacilityTypeRelativeSTD(%)Uraniumenrichment0.2Uraniumfabrication0.3Plutoniumreprocessing1.0Plutoniumfabrication0.5Scrapstore4.0Wastestore25.06 ContainmentandSurveillanceuContainmentandsurveillancecomplementsmaterialaccountancyby(a)detectingunusualactivities,(b)confirmingtherehasbeennoremovalofmaterialfrommeasured,sealedcontainersuTypicalmeasuresinclude:–Surveillancecameras–Tamper-resistantseals(whichwillbebrokenifsealeditemisopened)–Tamper-resistanttags(uniquelyidentifyparticularmeasureditems)uWhathappenswhencamerasgoout,sealsbreak?Often,re-inspectionrequireduClearly,containmentandsurveillancecontributetosafeguardsconfidence–butnoonehascomeupwithawaytomeasurehowmuchbetteraccountancyiswithcontainmentandsurveillanceaddedAccountancyandInspectionuLikebankauditor,inspectorsdon’tactuallycountallthemoney(measureallthematerial).Instead:–examinerecordsprovidedbyoperator–inspectstatisticalsamplesoftotalquantityofmaterial(basedontheriskofthediversiontheyareattemptingtodetect)tobuildconfidencerecordsareaccurate–inmodern,automatedfacilities,oftenrelyonin-linemeasurementequipmentbuiltbytheoperator--premiumonvalidatingthatmeasurementsareaccurateandunbiased–inspectormustbeabletomakeindependentjudgment--notsimplybelievewhattheoperatorsaysuDifferencebetweeninspector’smeasurementsandoperator’smeasurementsisMUF-D7 4DiversionPathsuDiversionintoMUF:“Gee,wecan’tfigureoutwherethatmissingmaterialwent”(noattempttofalsifyrecords)uDiversionintoMUF-D:“Gee,Idon’tknowwhyyourmeasurementsshowlessthanminedo”(typicallywouldrequirefalsifyingoperatorsaccountancyrecords)uDiversionwithfaking/tampering:“Gee,Ihopetheydon’tnoticethatweaddedmoreplutoniumtotheirsolutionsamplestomakeourPuconcentrationslookhigher”uDiversionwithsafeguardsplausiblydisrupted:“Gee,whenwehadthatfire,ourrecordsweredestroyed,andthefirefightersthrewoutabunchofcontaminatedmaterial--thatmustbewherethatplutoniumwent.”DesigningInspectionsuFirst,envisionwaysmaterialmightbedivertedfromfacilitytobeinspected--includingpossibilitiesforfaking/tamperinguSecond,envisioninspectionapproachesthatmightbeabletodetectthosediversionscenariosuThird,assessrequireddetectionprobability,basedonriskassociatedwiththeparticulardiversionscenario(e.g.,lowprobabilitysufficientfordetectingdiversionofnaturalU,highprobabilityneededfordetectingPudiversion)uFourth,designintensityofinspection(e.g.,frequency,fractionofmaterialstobesampled,etc.)toprovidedetectioncapabilitycommensuratewithriskuInreality:Largenumberofbudget,practicality,politicalfactorsenterintopicture8 DiversionScenarios:LEULWRuStatemightremovefreshLEUfuelassemblies--materialtobefurtherenriched,orirradiatedtoproducePu,elsewhere–Risk:low,requiresmajorcovertfacilities,extensiveprocessingofmaterial--lowdetectionprobabilitysufficient,longtimelinessgoalOKuStatemightremoveirradiatedspentfuelassembliescontainingPu–Risk:low-medium,PualreadyexistsbutrequiresreprocessingplantuImportantfactors:allnuclearmaterialitem-accountable,fuelincorecan’tberemovedexceptduringrefuelingoutage--canlimitinspectionfrequencyuInspectionapproach:camerasforfreshandspentfuelstorageareas,sealsonreactorvessels,onlyfewhumaninspections/year(“integratedsafeguards”evenlessintensive)DiversionScenarios:ReprocessingPlantuRemovefuelassemblies(orrods)fromspentfuelpool–Notpromising,stillneedareprocessingplanttogetthePuuRemovesolutionfromearlyprocessstages–Notpromising;Punotyetseparatedfromuraniumandfissionproducts,concentrationslow(fromdissolvertank,4000literssolutionweighing5tonsneededtoget8kgPu)uRemovePusolutionafterseparationandconcentration–Verypromising:Only40literssolutionweighing50kgneededfor8kgPu--andthousandsofpipesintoprocessareamakeundetectedremovalplausible–Couldcoverupdiversionby(a)falsifyingrecordsandtamperingwithinspectorsamples;(b)divertingslowlyenoughaccountancycan’tdetectit;or(c)introducingundeclaredmaterialintoplantuRemovefinishedPuoxide–Promising,buteasiertodetect(no1000sofpipesinandout)9 ReprocessingPlantPipingSafeguardingaReprocessingPlantuLargecommercialplant:800MTHM/yr,~8tPu/yru1close-outformeasuredinventory/yru1%uncertaintyfi80kgPuuIfonlychallengeifMUF>3s2MUFfi240kgPuuAlso,can’tmeettimelinessgoalwith1inventory/yruPartialsolutions:–Comprehensivetransparencyandcontainmentandsurveillancethroughoutplant–monitorallflows,detectallunusualactivity–Near-real-timeaccountancy–muchmorefrequentpartialmeasurementsofmaterialinprocess,withstatisticalmodelsdesignedtodetectbothabruptandprotracteddiversions10 Safeguardstechnologies:AwiderangeStatisticaltests:Canyoufindthediversioninthenoise?11 SafeguardsImplementationRealitiesFromthe2002SafeguardsImplementationReport(courtesyofIranianambassadortotheIAEASalehi):u357facilitiesundersafeguardsworldwidewithatleast1significantquantity(SQ)ofnuclearmaterialuOfthese,34facilitiesin15statesfailedtofullyattainquantitygoal(thatis,safeguardswouldnothavebeenabletodetectdiversionofanSQwithdesiredconfidence)u32facilitiesin15statesfailedtofullyattainthetimelinessgoal(thatis,detectionmightnothaveoccurredfastenough)u6facilities,quantitygoalhasn’tbeenmetforyears,“becausethemeasuresforeseeninsafeguardsapproachescouldnotbeimplemented”u6-7LWRs,inspectionsmessedupbySFhavingalreadybeenloadedintocasksbeforeinspectionNewSafeguardsMeasuresuHowtoconfirmnotjustthatthereisnodiversionfromdeclaredfacilities,butthattherearenosecret,undeclaredfacilities?(State’sdeclarationsnotonlyaccuratebutalsocomplete.)uKeyisintegrationofinformationfrommanysourcesu“Opensource”information–newspapers,visitor’saccounts,etc.uIntelligenceinformationprovidedbyIAEAmemberstates–ifyoucangetitreliably(validitychallengedbyIraqexperience)uNewrequirementsfordeclarationsofallrelevantimportsandexportsuExpandedaccesstomorelocations,includingforenvironmentalmonitoring12 NewSafeguardsMeasures(II)EnvironmentalMonitoringuAllnuclearfacilities,nomatterhowwell-contained,releasesomeatomsofPuandU–canbedetected,inprincipleuSwipestakenfromwallsandfloorsofabuildingcanrevealindetailwhatisotopicmixofplutoniumwasseparatedwhen,whatenrichmentsofUproducedinthatbuildinguSamplesfromasmuchasakilometeraway–pineneedles,soil,etc.–candetecttell-taletracesofPuorHEUuCentrifugeplantshardertofindthanreprocessing:–OTA:“Asmall,carefullydesigned,constructedandmaintainedplantproducingonlyenoughHEUforoneortwobombsperyear,ifequippedwithaventilationsystemusinghighefficiencyfilters,couldbequitedifficulttodetect.”NewSafeguardsMeasures(III)uFindingcovertfacilities(esp.centrifugeplants)requiresatleastsomeideaofwheretolook--fromintelligence,opensources,dissidents…resourcesandauthoritynotsufficienttotakesampleseverywhereuIntegratingallsourcesofinformationaboutallrelevantnuclearactivitiesinacountryiscrucialuOnly39stateshaveAdditionalProtocolsinforce(notincludingmostofthoseofmostinterest)--only13stateswhereIAEAhasyetbeen“abletoconcludethatallnuclearmaterialinthoseStateshadbeendeclared”13 NewSafeguardsMeasures(IV)uKeyemphasisnowon“integrating”traditionalandnewmeasures–withgoalofreducingintensityandcostoftraditionalmeasureswherenewmeasurescancompensateuNon-nuclear-weaponstatesinsisted,aspartofthepricefortheAdditionalProtocol,onreductionintraditionalmeasures--goalis“costneutrality”(thatis,afterinitialspike,everydollarspentonnewmeasuresshouldbematchedbyadollarsubtractedfromtraditionalmeasures)uWill“integratedsafeguards”mean“weakenedsafeguards”?–Example:abandoningcamerasinSFpools,sinceAdditionalProtocolwillhelpconfirmtherearenocovertreprocessingplants--buthowmuchconfidencedowehavethatthesemeasuresWILLconfirmthat?FindingacentrifugeplantuHeat?--moreorlessnegligible,notalikelysignatureuElectricitysupply?--maybe,butmodest(~50kw-hr/SWU,~7000SWU/yrfor2bombs/yr,<100kwcontinuouspower)--couldbesuppliedbyordinarypowerlines,buriedlines(e.g.,IraqatTarmiya,notdetected),diesel…uSize?--maybe,but1-2,000centrifugescouldfitinLittaueruUF6deliveries?--Notlikely,year’sdeliveries(~7tonsUF6)couldbedonein1truckuUraniumemissions?--maybe,butgooddesigncanreduce(Tarmiyahadtriplefilters),needtoknowwheretolookuProcurement?--crucial,buthardtofindwhereplantisuAcoustic/radiofromspinning?--onlyifyouknowexactlywheretolook14 Safeguardseffectiveness:thegoodnewsuIraq:ThoughdismissedasineffectivebytheU.S.government,internationalinspectionsworked.Post-invasionU.S.investigationrevealedthatSaddam’snuclearprogramwasessentiallyshutdownbecauseoffearsinspectorswouldfindanysignificantactivity.PictureprovidedbyIAEAwasfarmoreaccuratethanthatprovidedbyU.S.intelligence.uIran:IAEAinspectorshavepushedthroughonecoverstoryafteranother,forcingIrantoadmitdecadesoflies,andprovideunprecedentedaccessandinformationuNorthKorea:theNorthKoreansthoughttheyhadcleaneduptheirreprocessingplantbeforeallowinginspectorsin–buttheIAEAdetectedsamplesthatprovedNorthKoreandeclarationsonreprocessingwereliesSafeguardseffectiveness:thebadnewsuIraq:pre-1991,traditionalIAEAsafeguardstotallymissedmassiveIraqiillegalweaponsprogram–thisepisodedrovethenegotiationoftheAdditionalProtocoluIran:IAEAdidn’taskthetoughquestionsuntilforcedbytherevelationofNatanzenrichmentfacility.Why,whenIrandeclaredprocesslossesof~50%(andthensecretlyusedthe“lost”materialforenrichmentexperiments),didn’tanyonesay:“Howdidthathappen?”uLargebulkprocessingfacilities:atlargereprocessingplants,MOXfabricationplants,nearlyimpossibletoachievesafeguardsgoalsthroughmaterialaccountancyalone–needtorelyonsupplementarymeasures,includingthorough-goingtransparencythroughouttheplant15 ChallengestotheSafeguardsRegimeuNorthKorea:first-evercaseofcompletewithdrawalfromNPT;possiblemilitaryconfrontation,possible“dominoeffect”causingproliferationelsewhereinEastAsia,possiblesaleofnuclearmaterial,possible“loosenukes”ifregimecollapses…uIran:Iranhasnowtemporarily“suspended”enrichmentandreprocessingwork,acceptedAdditionalProtocol–willIrandefinitelystepawayfromthebomb,ormovetowardthebombandrenewedcrisis?uIraq/U.S.:U.S.pre-wardismissalofinspectionseffectivenesscouldunderminecredibilityofregime–butpost-warrealizationofhigheffectivenesscouldstrengthencredibility.ChallengestotheRegime(II)uProvidingconfidencethatcovertfacilitiesdonotexist--orfindingthemiftheydo--willremainfundamentalchallengeuManagingexpectations--int’lcommunityexpectsIAEAtopreventproliferation,butsafeguardscanonlydetect,notprevent(andtraditionalsafeguardsonlyfocusedon1offivepathstothebomb)uManagingthe“discrimination”issue--IAEAsafeguardsdesignednottodiscriminatebetween“good”and“bad”states,hence,mostinspectionsinJapan,Germany,orCanadauOngoingneedtoreform,reinvigoratethesystem--needculturefocusedonaskingthehardquestions,neverbeingfooled16 TheBudgetProblemuIAEAsafeguardsbudget~$90M/yruJustreceivedfirstincreasein15years,despitehugeincreasesin:–numberofcountrieswithsafeguardsagreements–numberoffacilitiesundersafeguards–quantitiesofmaterialsundersafeguardsuFatlongsincetrimmedoutofthesystem,nowcuttingintobone–evenwithincrease,needformoreresourcesisclearuKeystatesonIAEABoardofGovernors,havinggrudginglygonealongwithU.S.onmodestrecentincrease,unlikelytosupportlargeadditionalincreasesSafeguardsCases:MUFinJapanuInearly1990s,asafeguardedJapaneseMOXfabricationfacilitybeganhavingaproblemwith“holdup”ofMOXpowderinagloveboxuEventually,therewas>70kgPuinthisonegloveboxuSpecialNDAequipmentwasbeingusedtomeasurePufromoutsidetheglovebox–butwith10%uncertainty.Soonuncertaintybecameaslargeasan8kg“significantquantity”uProblemwasleakedtoMOXopponents,whomadeapublicsplashpointingouttherewasnowaytoprovematerialwasnotmissinguUltimately,IAEArequiredJapantocleanoutandmeasureallthematerialintheglovebox(tookmonths);Japandevelopednewprocesstopreventrecurrence;andJapanandLosAlamosdevelopednew,moreaccuratemeasurementequipmentformeasuringsuchmaterialsuMeasurementsdemonstratedthatnosignificantquantityofplutoniumwasdiverted–butnotwithintheIAEA’stimelinessgoals17 SafeguardsCases:UncertaintiesatJapan’sTokaiPlantuOvermanyyears,differencebetweenestimatedPuinspentfuelintroducedatTokaireprocessingplantandmeasuredPuoutputbuiltupto206kg(3%ofthroughput)bylate‘02uThis“shipper-receiverdifference”beganbuildingup“fromthebeginning”in1977--IAEAraisedissuein1987uIn1996(9yrslater),JapanandIAEAreachedagreementonIAEAsamplingprogramforHLW--showedhigherPucontentthanoperatorhadassumedanddeclareduImprovedsamplingapproachdevelopedduring1997-2000,whileplantshutdown--implementedin2002uLatestJapanesefigures:72kgofPuinHLW;105kgincladdinghulls;29kgfromneglectingPu-241decay(morelikely:somesignificantpartfrommisestimatingPuinSFinthefirstplace)SafeguardsCases:NUMECuInthe1960s,aU.S.facilityknownasNUMEC,inApollo,Pennsylvania,hadahugeMUF–enoughHEUforabombuThefacilitymanager,thoughholdingU.S.securityclearances,hadcloseties(andmultipleunexplainedsecretmeetings)withseniorIsraelinuclearofficials–andwasastrongZionistuResult:Widespreadsuspicion,andevenpublicaccusations,thatthematerialhadbeenstolenandprovidedtoIsrael.uYearslater,whenthefacilitywasdecommissioned,ahugeamountofHEUwasfoundtohavebeenabsorbedinthewallsandfloors–probablyexplainingthelargeMUFwithoutanymaterialhavingbeenstolenuCasecontributedtomajorstrengtheningofaccountingrequirementsintheUnitedStates.18 SafeguardsCases:IraqPre-1991uIraqisapartytotheNPTrequiredtohaveallofciviliannuclearactivitiesundersafeguardsuBeforetheGulfWar,IAEAinspections(focused,asmemberstateshadagreedtheyshouldbe,onlyonagreed“strategicpoints”ofdeclaredfacilities)didnotdetectanyillegalactivityinIraq–inspectorsuspicionswereneverfollowedthroughuIraqhadmassivenuclearweaponsprograminvolvingmanyfacilities–hugeundeclaredfacilities,someillegalactivityatdeclaredfacilities,plantoremoveresearchreactorHEUfromsafeguardsanduseitforaquickbombuU.S.andotherintelligenceagenciesknewIraqhadanuclearweaponsprogram,butwerecluelessastoitssizeandscopeSafeguardsCases:Iraq1991-1998uAftertheGulfWar,UNSecurityCouncilresolutionsgavetheIAEAandUNSCOMunprecedentedinspectionauthority,andmassivescopeofIraqiprogramwasrevealeduProvidedtestinggroundfornewsafeguardsmeasures,suchasenvironmentalmonitoring.(Dustonclothesof“humanshield”hostagesrevealedIraqiuraniumenrichment.)uNevertheless,evenwiththisunprecedented(andunlikelytoberepeated)access,therearestillquestionsoverwhethertheremightstillbesecretfacilitiesandbombcomponentsuIraqremainsdeterminedtomaintainitsWMDuDevelopmentofnew“AdditionalProtocol”wasinsubstantialpartareactiontotheIraqicase19 SafeguardsCases:Iraq2002-2004uStartinglate2002,IAEAbeganinspectionsinIraqwithunprecedentedpowersandaccess,followingupwhereinspectorshadleftoffin1998uIAEAfoundnoevidenceofrenewednuclearprogram–despitetelevisedSaddammeetingswithnuclearscientistshecalledhis“nuclearmujahedeen”uIAEAshowedconclusivelythatchargesrelatedtopurchasesofuraniumfromNigerandpurchasesofaluminumtubesforcentrifugeswerefalseuBushadministrationdismissedvalueofIAEAinspections,warnedtheywerebeingfooled,invadedIraquPost-warinspectionsmadeclear(a)inspectionsandsanctionseffectivelystoppedSaddam’snuclearprogram;(b)IAEApicturefarmoreaccuratethanU.S.pictureSafeguardsCases:NorthKoreauNorthKoreajoinedtheNPTandsignedasafeguardsagreementwiththeIAEAintheearly1990suDuringinspectionoftheYongbyonreprocessingplant,whichtheNorthKoreansthoughttheyhadcleanedupadequately,swipestakenfromthewallsofprocessareasrevealedthatplutoniumhadbeenseparatedattimesotherthanthosedeclared(ratioofPuandAmisotopes)–clearevidencetheNorthKoreanswerelyinguNorthKoreanskickedIAEAout,threatenedtowithdrawfromtheNPT,unloadedthefuelfromtheirreactorwithoutmonitoring,provokedinternationalcrisisultimatelyresolved(temporarily)by1994AgreedFrameworkuNownewcrisisoverUenrichmentprogram,restartofPuprogram–Uenrichmentsitesnotknown,hardtoverify20 SafeguardsCases:LibyauLibyawasamemberoftheNPT–onesafeguardedfacility,aSoviet-supplied,HEU-fueledresearchreactoruLibyahasverylittleindigenoustechnologybaseuAQKhannetworkprovidedcompletecentrifugedesigns,centrifugeparts,completecentrifuges,evenatombombdesignuLibyawasstillfarfromthebomb–nocentrifugecascade,evenasmallone,upandrunninguIAEAhadonlytraditionalsafeguardsagreementwithLibya(focusedondeclaredfacilities),hadnoinklingofsecretprogram–westernintelligencealsoknewlittleuQaddaffidecidesto“comeinfromthecold”,abandonWMDprograms–U.S.,U.K.,IAEAnowcooperatingtodismantle,verifyeliminationExportControlsuExportofkeynucleartechnologiesrelevanttonuclearweaponsistightlycontrolleduReprocessingtechnologyis(almost)entirelyunclassified–butexportsofactualsystemsandcomponentsstilltightlycontrolleduManyspecificsofenrichmenttechnologiesstillclassified,andexporttightlycontrolleduNPTZanggercommittee–maintains“triggerlist”ofitemsthatcannotbeexportedwithoutrequiringsafeguardsuLondonNuclearSuppliers’Group–developsjointpolicyofmajorsuppliersonwhatshouldandshouldnotbeexported,exchangesdata,commitmentto“full-scope”safeguardsasconditionofexport21 ExportControls(II)uSystemhasevolvedovertheyearsasweakpointswereidentified–stillmajorissues,constantdisputesuIraqrevelationsaftertheGulfWarweremajorwake-upcall–Iraqhadpurchasedtechnologycovertlyfromhugerangeofsources–revealedneedformuchbetterenforcement,industryunderstanding,sharingofintelligenceuMostmajorsuppliershavesincegreatlystrengthenedtheirenforcementofcontrols(esp.Germany)uRussiaamajorproblem–bothenforcementofitsexportlaws(e.g.,transferstoIranbyindividualinstitutes),andexplicitgovernmentdecisionstoexport(e.g.,technologiestoIran,fuelandreactorstoIndiainviolationofNSGcommitments)uMajorproblemsinvarietyofothercountriesaswellExportControls(III)uDifficultyofidentifying,controlling,eachtechnologythatmaycontribute:–Inefficient“calutron”technologywasnotcontrolled–Iraqexploitedloophole–RussiandealforlaserenrichmenttechnologytoIran–justbelowthelaserpowerthresholdagreedbytheNSG–CentrifugepartsmanufacturedinMalaysiaforLibyaandIran,aspartofAQKhannetwork,wereprobablynotcontrolled–Ringmagnets(forupperbearingofcentrifuges)providedbyChinesefirmtoPakistanwerenotonNSGlistuImportanceof“catch-all”controls–Catch-allcontrolsrequirelicenseforanyitemtoentitiesinvolvedinproliferationactivities–Butalsocancomplicatedesirableactivities(e.g.,increasedifficultyofprovidingnuclearsecurityequipmenttoIndian,Pakistaninuclearprograms)22 ExportControls:theAQKhanNetworkuLatestwake-upcallistheglobalblack-marketnuclearsupplynetworkestablishedbyAQKhan–“fatherofthePakistanibomb”–andanunknownnumberofothersuKhanoriginallystolecentrifugedesignsfromURENCO,establishedPakistan’senrichmentprogramforbombsuNetworksuppliedcentrifugedesigns,centrifugeparts,full-scalecentrifuges,atombombdesigns,over~20years,to:–NorthKorea–Iran–Libya–Others…?uKhan,a“nationalicon”inPakistan,pardonedbyMusharraf–howmuchofnetworkwillberolledup?Howmuchirreversibledamagedone?ExportControls(III)uTostrengthenglobalsystem,need:–Lawsinallrelevantcountriestocriminalizedangeroustransfers,withappropriatepenalties,andstrongenforcement(UNSecurityCouncilresolutionnowunderdiscussion)–Assistancetokeycountriestoputeffectivecontrolsinplace–Strongcontroloverpersonnelwithaccesstokeysecretsandtechnologies(e.g.,Russianpractice:weaponsexperts’passportskeptinsecurityofficer’ssafe)–Greatlyexpandedintelligence,law-enforcementsharing(includingwithIAEA)uEffectiveexportcontrolsrequiresanoverallsystemthatgivesexportersincentivestocomply–backedupbytechnicalexpertswhocandrawtherightbalancebetweenpromotingtradeandcontrollingdangeroustechnologiesu“Priceofnonproliferationiseternalvigilance.”23 SomeKeyIssuesuWhattodoaboutstatesthatsimplyrefusetojoin,orcomplywith,regime(e.g.,Iraq,NorthKorea)?uHowtodetectsecret,hiddenfacilities?EvenonceAdditionalProtocolisinforceeverywhere,it’sdifficultuHowtoensureallnuclearmaterialworldwideissecureandaccountedfor?uHowtoaddresssupplierswhoarefailingtoenforcetheirexportlaws,orconsciouslybreakingtherules?uInadequateresourcesforsafeguards–IAEAonnear-flatbudgetsince1985,despitedramaticincreaseinnumberofstates,quantitiesofmaterialundersafeguardsuNon-discrimination–mostsafeguardsresourcesspentinJapan,Canada,andGermany,tomeettechnicalgoalsthatarethesameforeveryoneSomeOpportunitiesuRedoubledglobalefforttoensurethatallweapons-usablenuclearmaterialissecureandaccountedfor,tohigh,consistent,anddemonstrablestandards–includinggreatlyexpandedefforttoaddressnuclearlegacyoftheformerSovietUnionuFissilecutoff–endproductionofPuandHEUforweaponsworldwide(requires2-3xmoreinspectionsworldwide)uIntegratetraditionalandnewsafeguardsmeasuresuStrengthen,reducecostofsafeguardsandsecuritywithnewtechnologies(incl.commercialsecurityandinventory-trackingtechnologies)Theworldneedsawholenewgenerationofsafeguardsexperts–anexcitingandcriticallyimportantjobfornuclearengineers24 SomeOpportunities(II)uSafeguardsandsecurityworkmakesitpossibletoapplyengineeringskillstoprojectswithimmediateimpactonreducingthreatstoU.S.andglobalsecurityuMuchfasterturn-aroundfromideatoexecutionthanmostnucleartechnologies–becausecangorightoutandbuilditandtestitinthelabuOpportunitiesatU.S.nuclearlaboratories,DOE,IAEA…FormoreinformationNewreportandwebsite,“ControllingNuclearWarheadsandMaterials,”availableat:http://www.nti.org/cnwm25